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Can Haiti's Police Reforms Be Sustained?
January 1998

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Executive Summary

The National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR) and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) have monitored police reforms in Haiti since the Haitian National Police's deployment in June 1995. In January 1997, we published a comprehensive review of the Haitian National Police (HNP), The Human Rights Record of the Haitian National Police, jointly with Human Rights Watch/Americas. We identified problems with training, management, supervision and excessive use of force, and urged the Haitian government, police officials and international donors to address them promptly. This report reviews the performance of the HNP during 1997. It identifies areas in which the force has made progress, returns to problems raised in our January report which have not been adequately addressed, and raises a number of new concerns that came to light this year.

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Police Progress in 1997

The HNP gained experience and confidence in 1997, its second full year of operation. It has become markedly less dependent upon the guidance of the United Nations Civilian Police (CivPol). On management and administration issues, we noted several improvements. Most regional and central leadership posts are now filled. There are departmental directors in every region, police commissioners in all towns, and most of the inspector posts have been assigned. Police are far better equipped than they were one year ago. Most police stations in larger towns now have radio connections to police headquarters.

The Office of the Inspector General (IG), responsible for investigating and sanctioning police abuse, has expanded significantly over the last year. High profile cases, many police killings and serious police crimes appear to be investigated and sanctioned quite efficiently. The director general and inspector general appear committed to purging the HNP of abusive and criminal elements, and can do so more easily now under a grant of authority from the Superior Council of the National Police which permits them to dismiss officers on reasonable suspicion of inappropriate behavior. After a year in which the inspector general's reporting on the cases of police abuse under investigation declined in quality and frequency, the inspector general now appears to be committed to producing comprehensive monthly reports in 1998.

Finally, training programs at the police academy have expanded. The basic course for new recruits now lasts nine months, rather than four. And officers in the field are being brought back to the academy for additional short-term skills training.

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PE03257A.gif (4096 bytes)Continuing Human Rights, Leadership and Management Problems

While the HNP has made real progress in these areas, serious problems identified in our last report remain unresolved. Most problematical, police excessive use of force, particularly beatings, continues at a worrisome level: HNP personnel killed some 46 people between January and October 1997, about half of which appear to have been human rights violations. This brings the total number of killings by the HNP since its first deployment in June 1995 to at least 92 and possibly closer to 137, as many as half of which were human rights violations. Beatings and other forms of mistreatment, while not systematic or routine, increased in 1997 after dropping sharply in the second half of 1996.

HNP leadership and officers have evidenced a troubling lack of respect for constitutional due process guarantees regarding searches, arrest warrants and pre-trial detention (garde-à-vue). We find this cavalier attitude toward fundamental constitutional protections, highlighted by the arrest and detention of a former head of the HNP, Leon Jeune, in November 1997, alarming and unacceptable, and we urge immediate, remedial action to enforce respect for these norms within the HNP itself.

While high-profile cases, many police killings and serious police crimes appear to be investigated and sanctioned quite efficiently by the inspector general, he has not sanctioned many cases of police beatings. The inspector general appears particularly concerned by police criminality and is focusing resources on those issues. However, we believe that neglecting police beatings on the grounds that they are relatively less important sends a message of tolerance for abuse which may be contributing to its stubborn persistence in the force today.

We are also concerned that the inspector general not reduce the already-stretched resources now dedicated to investigating allegations of human rights violations in order to conduct the administrative audits which are also part of the office's mandate. These audits are important for improving the management of the HNP and generating the accountability, responsibility, and control on the local level needed to reduce ongoing human rights abuses, but should not be conducted at the expense of the inspector general's investigation work.

While most supervisory posts have been filled, management systems that would hold them accountable for the performance of their police units remain very weak. Commanders, chosen on the basis of academic records and exams, have often turned out to have poor leadership and administrative skills in the field. Communication within the force remains poor, particularly in rural areas. Regular reports and information flows on institutional issues are extremely limited. While the police are far better equipped than they were 18 months ago, the administrative ability of the HNP to track, maintain and resupply equipment is terrible. Maintenance remains appalling, with equipment, including guns, lying around in unsecured piles.

Police arrogance toward the population continues, and the community policing programs which might address that problem have not been a priority of the HNP leadership. The HNP disbanded a community policing initiative in Cap Haïtien.

No progress has been made in judicial reform; as a result, police accused of killings and other abuses are not tried, the judiciary plays no role in controlling police abuse of due process protections, and officers are tempted to avoid the judiciary entirely by taking the law into their own hands. Communication between the police and the judiciary on procedures for arrest and detention of suspects is poor.

Finally, corruption in the force (principally from the growing drug trade) and the efforts of political forces to gain influence over appointments and operations are becoming ever-more-serious concerns of the HNP leadership. The HNP director general and inspector general are attempting to deal with these problems by dismissing or sanctioning officers they suspect of ties with criminal gangs and by consolidating communications and reporting procedures through the chain of command.

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Conclusion

Haitian government officials and senior HNP leaders remain committed to creating a professional and effective police force. The police force is clearly more experienced and confident and its capabilities have improved over the last year. With ongoing well-targeted and coordinated international assistance, the HNP should be able to continue to strengthen itself as an institution. However, the HNP's ability to stand up to external threats -- crime, anti-democratic provocation and attack, international drug traffickers, and efforts to corrupt or politicize the police -- will depend on building and reinforcing professional standards, solid administrative and disciplinary controls, and consolidating a new code of ethics and way of doing business.

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Recommendations

(1) The HNP should demonstrate a policy of zero tolerance for all human rights abuses. Specifically, the inspector general should seek to investigate and punish cases of mistreatment and beatings as well as more serious police use of force. Such disciplinary issues should be a priority for departmental and local HNP commanders, and their record in implementing discipline should be a key factor in evaluating administrative audits and in personnel reviews and promotions policies.

(2) While we agree that HNP administrative audits will be important for holding local commanders accountable for supervision and discipline, the investigative function of the IG should not be reduced. The IG plays such a central role in controlling police abuse that we believe the government of Haiti, the HNP and the international community should find the resources to increase the size of the IG so that it can reasonably perform both functions.

(3) The IG must publish regular, detailed reports identifying the quantity, nature and status of cases under investigation, including the names of police involved and the nature and place of the alleged violation. We are greatly encouraged by the IG's expressed commitment to publish such reports on a monthly basis in 1998.

(4) The HNP should immediately focus training and management resources on the need for police officers to follow legal procedures when conducting searches or arrests, to fully comply with the 48-hour detention limitation, and to obtain concrete, credible evidence to support warrant requests and the detention of suspects beyond 48 hours. This training should include the entire command structure of the HNP.

(5) The government of Haiti should fully fund the Office of the Protector of Citizens (OPC). Haitian government authorities should strongly support the OPC's role in channeling accusations of police abuse to the IG and judicial authorities and in overseeing internal police investigations conducted by the IG. The government of Haiti should provide the OPC with the resources to establish a civilian complaints review board with its own staff and resources.

(6) HNP authorities should work with the Organization of American States / United Nations Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) and international donors to develop a long-term strategy to evaluate community policing and should develop a program appropriate to the Haitian context and oriented to address issues of police arrogance and crime fighting as well as community relations. Concurrently, both police academy and ongoing field training should emphasize the mission of the HNP to serve and protect the people and develop a set of standards for community interaction, including patrols on foot or bicycle, school visits, availability to the media, meetings with local organizations and authorities, and working with neighborhood watches.

(7) International assistance programs should be targeted to assist the HNP with the administrative command and control problems we have highlighted in this report. 

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CAN HAITI'S POLICE REFORMS BE SUSTAINED?
  Executive Summary
  1. Police Progress in 1997
  2. Continuing Human Rights Leadership and Management Problems
  3. Conclusion
  4. Recommendations

I - Introduction: The Haitian National Police

  1. Organization of and international support for the new police force
  2. Findings of the January 1997 report

II - Police Progress In 1997

III - Continuing Human Rights Problems

  1. Excessive use of force
  2. HNP disregard of constitutional due process protections
  3. Police arrogance: the "chief" mentality
  4. Police involvement in crime and corruption
  5. Police politicization
  6. Police shortage

IV - HNP Institutional Weakness

  1. Leadership problems and lack of professionalism
  2. Specialized units
  3. Administration and equipment

V - The Inspector General

  1. Attention to police beatings
  2. Reporting on police abuse
  3. Institutional audits
  4. Lack of external complaint mechanisms

VI - Community-Police Relations

VII - The Judicial System and  Impunity for Police Killings

VIII - Conclusions And Recommendations

Acknowledgements

 

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