Events of July 28, 2001 - Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti

National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR)
Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organizations (POHDH)
Lawyers' Committee for Respect and Individual Liberty (CARLI)

August 2001

Introduction

The Haitian people, particularly the residents of Pétion-ville, experienced some difficult hours during the night of July 27 and into the morning hours of July 28, 2001.  The first news of the attack reported that a coup d'état staged by former military personnel had been staged at the National Police Academy.  Since Saturday, July 28 there has been a barrage of differing accounts and conflicting information, each account more contradictory than the last.  This climate of confusion and diversion was further aggravated by a wave of arrests, and flagrant and systematic human rights violations in the Central Department.  A delegation of human rights organisations, composed of the National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR), the Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organisations (POHDH), and the Committee of Lawyers for Respect and Individual Liberty (CARLI), was formed and sent out to observe the human rights situation in the Central Plateau following the events of July 28, 2001.

1. Methodology

The following methodology was adopted for the purpose of collecting information on human rights violations:  meetings with judicial authorities, police officers, and local residents; meetings with notables, victims, parents of victims, presumed perpetrators, and all others in a position to provide any necessary and essential information.  Given the tense situation that prevailed in the region, it was not possible to meet with all those involved in the incident.  For the purpose of establishing an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect with the outside observers of the delegation, a method of open dialogue was employed.

2. Reconstruction of the Facts

The following accounts of the facts were gathered from four cities:  Port-au-Prince, Mirebalais, Belladères, and Hinche.

1. Port-au-Prince    In the early hours of Saturday, July 28, 2001, a round of shots was heard outside the Pétion-ville Police Station.  The shots were more intense at the National Police Academy on Route Frères, which according to local press reports, had fallen under the control of a six-person commando.  The group, dressed in uniforms of the former Armed Forces of Haiti (FadH) and armed with weapons of war, held the National Police Academy hostage for approximately five hours, from 2:00 to 7:00 AM.  At around 3:00 AM, Instructors on the scene used their cell phones to inform the hierarchy of the Haitian National Police (HNP) of the situation at hand.  Likewise, Commissioner Jean Eddy Cantave had time to inform his superiors, specifically Commissioner Jean Yonel Trécil, about the hostage situation before being shot and killed sometime around 6:00 AM.  The armed group was able to leave the Police Academy at around 7:00 AM without any difficulty.
   
   
2. Mirebalais.  A commando aboard a vehicle descended upon the Mirebalais police station at around 8:00 AM.  One of the two police officers present at the station escaped into a ravine while the other officer, by the name of Donaïs Bruno Célusca, was shot and killed.  The armed group destroyed means of communication before taking the weapons of the police station.  In all likelihood the purpose of the raid was to stock up on weapons and ammunition.
   
   
3. Belladères.   A commando made its appearance in the town of Belladères on Saturday, July 28 at approximately 9:00 in the morning.  The armed group fired rounds in the air in all directions before completely taking over the town until 5:00 PM.  In the process of the takeover, one woman was shot in the back.  The priest of Belladères drove her to the hospital in Mirebalais.
   
   At around 11:00 AM, one of the members of the commando went to the “Rotation FM” radio station where he read a message to the population.  He called for the former military members to join them.  This operation, he said, was being carried out by former military personnel with nothing against the population; they would simply like to “take back their barracks”.  In the meantime, local authorities had had the time to seek refuge in the Dominican Republic, returning Sunday, July 29 after the HNP took control of the city.
   
   At around 2:00 PM, a helicopter circled above the city for 30 minutes, after which it retreated without landing.  Around 6:00 PM, two other helicopters came and landed in the football field, located at the entrance of Belladères.  They were carrying members of the Special Unit, known as the “Swat Team”.  The Swat Team entered the village by the east corridor.   At the arrival of the Swat Team, the armed men left the police station and the city without difficulty.
   
   The repression began when the Swat Team took control of Belladères.  They stopped and assaulted all those who passed in front of the police station and began searching the homes of certain members of the former FadH and of those close to the Democratic Convergence (DC).  The searches were carried out under the direction of the elected Lavalas leaders who were in possession of a list containing names of people to arrest.
   
   
4. Hinche. The information coming out of Hinche was contradictory at best.  According to the police, the same commando descended upon Hinche.  The armed group was not able to enter the town because four police officers had been stationed at the entrance of town.  In the police account there was an exchange of fire between the police and the commando.  Subsequently, three of the police officers abandoned their weapons and surrendered at the arrival of the armed men.  One officer, Zacharie Simon refused to surrender and was killed.  Allegedly this took place on Saturday, July 28 at approximately 12:30 in the afternoon.  However, the delegation was unable to find a member of the population to confirm or refute this information.
   
   Following this event, police officers proceeded to arrest Jean-Yves Dumas and Séraphin Hébert on Saturday the 28^th.  Hébert was severely beaten and detained in the police station's holding cell.  These arrests were carried out without warrants and without the presence of judicial authorities.  Further arrests were made on Sunday, July 29 when police arrested Mr. Vièt Altidor, Esq., Mr. Jacquelin, and Chenet Gauthier who were later released.
   
   The police maintain that there was an exchange of gunfire with Wilner Jean-Louis, a former military man who had close affiliations with the Democratic Convergence.  According to police, Wilner was found dead as a result of this shoot-out.  Police then sought out Justice of the Peace, Jean Cantave to observe the body of the victim, and Investigating Magistrate Jean-Claude Cétoute to grant permission to search the victim's home.  The search of Wilner's home revealed nothing suspicious.
   
   The Justice of the Peace, Jean Cantave, could not observe the scene and the body of the victim as he should have.  He was pressured by the agents of the Swat Team who demanded that he write quickly.  “Ekri bagay ou a an abreje, nou prese, nou pa genyen tan pou nou pèdi”.¹  He was not authorized to hear the testimony of witnesses who were on the scene at the time of the shooting.  Furthermore, well before the observation of the body, police arrested potential witnesses of the so-called “exchange of gunfire”.  The Justice of the Peace was prohibited from searching for more complete information.    
   
   In addition, a body was found in the Inquite River.  Unidentifiable, the man was wearing a uniform of the ex-Léopard Corps and had two rounds of ammunition around his neck.  In his pockets were 20 Dominican pesos and a copy of the Dominican national anthem.  After observing the body, the police buried him on the shore of the river.
   
   The police, accompanied by some judicial authorities and members of the ruling party, had in their possession a list, according to them coming from the National Palace, of houses to be searched – houses of former military personnel, supporters of the Democratic Convergence, and professionals.  In the process, several people were arrested, mistreated and detained in the local holding cell.
   
   In the meantime, the Centre de Formation, where the office of the legal assistance for the Mouvement Paysans Papaye is located (No. 140, Rue Rivage), was completely destroyed in a fire set by unidentified men.  While some rumors circulated around town, the supporters of the Fanmi Lavalas and the police were looking for Mr. Chavannes Jean-Baptiste and his supporters.

3. Results

1. Deaths
   
   Seven people were found dead, five of whom were police officers, one former military and one unidentified individual.  They are as follows:

• Port-au-Prince, Jean Eddy Cantave, Police Commissioner, Administrator of the National Police Academy; Lourdes James Bazemar and Michel Milfleur, police cadets in training
  
• Mirebalais, Bruno Donaïs Célusca, police officer at the Mirebalais police station
  
• Hinche, Zacharie Simon, police officer at the Hinche police station; Wilner Jean-Louis, former military and supporter of the Democratic Convergence, and one unidentified individual

2. Injured
   
   An estimated 18 people were injured during and after the events of July 28, 2001.  Ninety-five per cent  (95%) of those were trainees in the police academy.
   
3. Arrests
   
   Several people were arrested and held in holding cells.  It is difficult to establish a complete list of these individuals.  However, certain arrests were made late in the day, outside of judicial norms.  The number of people arrested is estimated to be more than 30.  Among them were:

Port-au-Prince, the people arrested are exclusively police officers.  They are as follows:

• Divisional Commissioner Mario Andrésol
• Commissioner Jean Yonel Trécil, Director of the National Police Academy
• Commissioner Elder Kersy, Coordinator of Instructors
• Inspector Max Harry Isaac, Police Instructor
• Inspector Florian Dorcé, Police Instructor
• Inspector Orival Jacques Joël, Police Instructor
• Inspector Billy Lemaine, Police Instructor
• Inspector Saint-Armand Frantz, Police Instructor

Belladères, the people arrested are professionals, former candidates and supporters of the Democratic Convergence, former military and members of their families.  They are as follows:

• Mr. Moïse Tout Puissant, supporter of former military personnel
• Engineer Nicolas Duccé, former candidate for Mayor of Belladères
• Mr. Pierre Emmanuel Théophile
• Mr. Romaine Bourssicot, former Deputy candidate
• Family and wives of former military personnel

Hinche, the people arrested are professionals, former candidates and supporters of the Democratic Convergence, former military and certain members of their families.  They are as follows:

• Mr. Hébert Séraphin, Coordinator of Espace de Concertation in Hinche
• Mr. Jean Yves Damus, agricultural technician and iron-worker
• Me Viet Alcindor, Treasurer of the Bar of Order of Lawyers of Hinche, Lawyer for the Mouvement Paysans Papaye (MPP) regarding the case of November 2, 2000
• Mr. and Mrs. Pierre Gaston, brother-in-law and sister of the murdered former military member, Wilner Jean-Louis
• Mr. Chénet Gauthier
• Mr. Jacquelin, businessman

4. Attitudes of the Authorities

1. Police Officers
   
   The Inspectors and Commissioner Jean Eddy Cantave informed the police authorities of the occupation of the Academy by an armed group at around 3:00 AM.  Commissioner Cantave was killed at around 6:00 AM and the armed men left the Academy around one hour later.  Several questions arise out of this scenario:
   
   How can one explain that Commissioner Jean Eddy Cantave was able to communicate with his superiors while being held hostage by armed former military members?  Did these armed individuals allow the communication between Commissioner Cantave and his superiors on the outside?
   
   How does one explain that fact that six armed individuals, claiming to be of the former military, were able to obtain easy access to the National Police Academy? Why didn't the Compagnie d'Intervention et de Maintien d'Ordre (CIMO), l'Unité de Sécurité de la Garde du Palais National (USGPN), or the Swat Team intervene?  Did these groups receive orders not to react, or is it that they were unable to react as needed?
   
   How does one explain the fact that approximately four hours after the police authorities from le Centre de Recherche Opérationnel (CRO) were informed of the situation, no definitive action was taken to prevent the armed individuals from leaving the grounds of the Academy with such ease?
   
   How does one explain the fact that these were police officers from CIMO and/or the Swat Team who told the Justice of the Peace how to write his report regarding the observation of the death of Mr. Wilner Jean-Louis?  Why did police take control of eyewitnesses (by way of arrest) of the so-called “exchange of gunfire” between Mr. Wilner and the police?  All this leads one to believe that this is a case of a summary execution.
   
   In the morning of July 28, police stations across the country received instructions to take all measures to protect their police stations.  Thus, four police officers were posted at the entrance of the city of Hinche, one of who, Zacharie Simon, according to police information, was killed because he refused to follow the three other police officers, who surrendered to the armed commando.  Can this not also be considered a case of summary execution?
   
   How does one come to understand the negligence and laxness of the superior police authorities in the face of grave danger for the lives of the hostages, notably Commissioner Jean-Eddy Cantave?  Likewise, how does one interpret the behaviour of the Director of the Western Department, Commissioner Hermione Léonard, who affirmed to the press that she had seen two armed men (former military) posted outside the Academy and yet failed to react?
   
   
2. Judicial Officials
   
   In Hinche the judicial authorities are in a difficult situation with regards to the equitable distribution of justice in the city.  Following the examples throughout the rest of the country, very few judges appear to be well informed about the role of the police as auxilaries to justice.  This attests to the analysis of the behaviour of the judge whether Justices of the Peace or Investigating Magistrates.  Regarding the aforementioned events, the judicial authorities did prove a certain complicity by not having taken their responsibilities in the face of flagrant and systematic human rights violations committed by police officers.  They did not denounce the incident and, likewise, did not lend their support to curbing the irregularities in procedure committed by the police.  They were complacent toward the police and those who acting as informants for the police.  They never used their authority over the PNH to defer the suspects to the Parquet within 48 hours following their arrests, as stipulated in article 26 of the Haitian Constitution:

No one can be held in detention if he/she has not been brought, within 48 hours of his/her arrest, before a judge called to rule on the legality of the arrest, or if the judge does not confirm the detention to be justifiable.

Thus, the prolonged detention of people arbitrarily and illegally arrested in the Central Plateau is in part due to the irresponsible attitude of the judicial authorities and also in part due to the fear of being incriminated by the elected officials of Fanmi Lavalas in Hinche as being partisan.

It can be noted that certain judicial authorities did attempt to respond to the mistreatment inflicted upon apprehended individuals at the hands of the police.  In spite of this timid reaction of the judicial authorities, several people arrested were tortured regardless of articles 25 and of the Haitian Constitution of 1987 and the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, respectively:

All harshness and constraint that is not necessary to apprehend or hold a person in custody, all moral pressure or physical brutality, notably during questioning, are forbidden.

No one shall be subjected to torture, nor cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment.

The judicial authorities of the Central Plateau looked on with a passive attitude towards the arrest of people in the place of others, a practice that is contrary to the instructions set forth in article 24.3, line (e) of the Haitian Constitution of 1987, which reads:

Responsibility is a personal.  No one can be arrested in the place of another.

In Hinche and Belladères, family members of former members of the military were arrested and detained without any intervention from the Parquet to grant them unconditional release.  During the house searches of Saturday, July 28, without corpus delicti and authorization from present judicial authorities, police proceeded with arrests.  No judge denounced the authoritative and arbitrary character of the arrests; rather nothing was done to curb the work of the police, including the questioning that followed the arrests.  At the time of their depositions, people had been in custody for more than 48 hours.  Such behaviour does not bring honour to the judiciary, nor does it contribute to its reinforcement or its independence.

3. Governmental Officials
   
   The Aristide-Chérestal government dealt with the events of July 28, 2001 in a political manner.  Without a National Intelligence Service, governmental authorities did not have access to information that would have allowed them to anticipate the events of July 28, and respond adequately to the events that transpired.  However, from the morning of the 28^th, the government entered into gratuitous accusations instead of showing its capacity to objectively analyse the situation.  This political approach to the events has certainly complicated the work of the Investigating Commission.  In fact, it can be said that the government provoked a series of human rights violations in Port-au-Prince as well as the Central Plateau.

5. Attitude of Supporters of the Ruling Political Party

On Saturday, July 28, 2001, Amos Mételus and James Joseph, two Fanmi Lavalas officials from Hinche, delivered to the police a list of names for the purpose of searching their homes and for their eventual arrests.  Around 2:00 PM, the police, accompanied by these two officials, arrested Hébert Séraphin, coordinator of l'Espace de Concertation of Hinche and Jean Yves Damus, without warrants and without a formal charge as stipulated in article 24.2 of the Haitian Constitution:

Arrest and detention, except in cases of flagrant offences, shall not take place without a warrant written by a legally competent civil servant.

According to articles 20 and 50 of the Penal Code, denunciations and complaints must be brought before the Public Prosecutor and the Investigating Magistrate.  The articles read as follows:

Each person who witnesses an offence, having been at the scene of a crime or misdemeanour (committed against public security, against the life or property of an individual) or with a suspect at the time of the offence, will likewise be required to go before the Public Prosecutor.

Each person who claims to have been wronged by a crime or a misdemeanour, having been at the scene of the crime, the suspect's residence, or with the suspect at the time of the crime, can render a complaint, and can file a civil action before the Investigating Magistrate.

Spurning these two articles of the Penal Code, Amos Mételus and James Joseph preferred to play the role of police informants for the purpose of better directing the operations of the police on the ground, and to further persecute their adversaries, rather than taking their complaints before the Public Prosecutor or an Investigating Magistrate.  According to the mandated procedure, no one has the authority to denounce or arrest an individual, except in cases of flagrant misdemeanors with people suspected of the infraction in question.  An arrest facilitated by a list of names given to police is an arbitrary, authoritarian, and illegal act.

The attitude of those close to power was also observed in Belladères as in other parts of the country.  It must be asked whether these actions are the result of an excess of zeal or of a covert strategy on the part of a governing party pursuing a state of authoritarianism.

6. Evolution of the Situation

After the delegation's press conference of August 2, 2001, new arrests were made and other detainees were released.

In Belladères on Thursday, August 9, Lubéris Reynald, journalist and Claude François, operator of Radio Rotation FM were arrested without warrants, and the station was searched without the presence of competent judicial authorities.  The two employees were released that afternoon without having been brought before a judge.  Equally, eight out of eleven people arrested and transferred to Port-au-Prince were released the same day by the ruling of the Parquet of Port-au-Prince.  Similarly in Hinche, the individuals arrested on July 28 and 29 were released, following an ordinance from the Parquet of the Tribunal de Première Instance.

In Port-au-Prince, a number of officers of the HNP were arrested and spent several days in the holding cell or in isolation.  Several of them have been released.  On Friday, August 10, the court ordered the immediate release of DivisionalCommissioner Mario Andrésol, who until Monday afternoon, had not been released in accordance with the decision of the court.

7. Recommendations

In light of the arbitrary and authoritarian actions that took place, human rights organisations:

1. Demand the immediate release of all people illegally arrested who at present are still being detained, in accordance with articles 26,26.1, 26.2 and 27 of the Haitian Constitution of 1987.
   
   
2. Invite the ruling powers to take all necessary measures to encourage their supporters to respect the principles of individual freedom, the foundation for a democratic state functioning under the rule of law.
   
   
3. Encourage the powers that be to create an independent, credible, and honest investigating commission for the purpose of:
   
   
   • Shedding light on the events of July 28, 2001;
     
     
   • Determining the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the police officers and former military members;
     
     
   • Determining the circumstances around the arrests and prolonged detentions following the events.
     
     
4. Insist that the governing powers put an end to the politization of the Haitian National Police, such that it can respond to its mission to serve and to protection the population in a professional manner.
   
   
5. Insist that the governing powers consolidate the constitutional structures guaranteeing fundamental freedoms and public security. (General Inspection of the PNH, Scientific and Judiciary Police etc.)